Imaging neural signatures of consciousness: 'what', 'when', 'where' and 'how' does it work?
'What' do we call consciousness? 'When' and 'Where' in the brain do conscious states occur, and 'How' conscious processing and conscious access to a given content work? In the present paper, we present a non-exhaustive overview of each of these 4 major issues, we provide the reader with a brief description of the major difficulties related to these issues, we highlight the current theoretical points of debate, and we advocate for the explanatory power of the "global workspace" model of consciousness (Baars 1989; Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dehaene, Changeux et al. 2006) which can accommodate for a fairly large proportion of current experimental findings, and which can be used to reinterpret apparent contradictory findings within a single theoretical framework. Most notably, we emphasize the crucial importance to distinguish genuine neural signatures of conscious access from neural events correlated with consciousness but occurring either before ('upstream') or after ('downstream').